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(1) Introduction 
After much anticipation, the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted at the third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) 
in Kyoto, Japan. The protocol, for the first time in history, establishes legally-binding 
reduction targets for all major greenhouse gases (GHGs). As such, it represents a major 
step forward in the international efforts to avert the threat of climate change. After a 
long and exhausting negotiation marathon, COP-3 adopted differentiated targets for 
industrialized countries, which were 5.2 per cent on average, for the commitment period 
from 2008 until 2012. The Kyoto Protocol furthermore introduces several novel 
“flexibility instruments,” including joint implementation (JI), emissions trading, and a 
new Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for project-based cooperation with 
developing countries.  
It is not clear, however, how soon the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force because of 
its rather high ratification threshold. The protocol contains a “double-trigger,” which 
requires not only a certain number of ratifications, but also the reduction of a certain 
percentage of emissions before it enters into force. As a result, the United States de facto 
has a veto. This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the ratification process in 
the US Senate is sure to be slow and cumbersome. Furthermore, the protocol is 
characterized by a high number of unresolved issues. Its ratification, therefore, will 
depend on the successful outcome of follow-up negotiations in the years to come. 
                                                
* An edited version of this paper was published under the title „The Kyoto Protocol: Unfinished Business“ 
in: Environment, vol. 40, 1998, no. 6, pp. 16-20. DOI: 10.1080/00139159809604595 
 
2 
This report will first provide a brief account of the political developments that led to 
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Second, it will provide a preliminary analysis of the 
Kyoto Protocol itself, and, third, it will assess the prospects for the further development 
of international climate policy and law in 1998 and beyond. Developments outside of 
the Kyoto negotiations will be included to further elucidate the actual international 
negotiations. 
(2) Political Developments 
The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on the afternoon of 11 December—one day after 
the official closure of COP-3—resulted from the large amount of political attention that 
climate change had received during 1997. This attention was not so much a result of the 
three meetings of the AGBM (Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate) that were held in 
March, August, and October. Rather, it resulted from the elevation of the climate 
negotiations to the agenda of the Denver Summit of the G-7/P-8 (Denver Summit of the 
Eight) and the UN General Assembly Special Session on Progress Achieved Towards 
Meeting Objectives of the Earth Summit (UNGASS), both held in June.  
At the Denver Summit, Prime Minister Hashimoto of Japan realized, for the first time, 
the importance and seriousness of the climate change issue and, consequently, the 
potential political gain or loss for his country depending on the outcome of COP-3. At 
the UNGASS, President Bill Clinton of the United States took a tough stance on climate 
change, despite the fierce opposition of the US Republican Congress and the fossil fuel 
industry. These groups responded in full force to this challenge. The fossil fuel industry 
sponsored a $13 million advertising campaign warning against the serious adverse 
economic consequences of any legally binding agreement, due to the fact that only 
industrialized countries would assume legally binding targets. The Senate responded by 
unanimously adopting the “Byrd-Hagel” resolution, which emphasized the validity of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s findings, but stated that the 
United States should not sign any protocol that mandates new commitments for 
developed countries without mandating “new specific scheduled commitments” by 
developing countries to limit GHG emissions “within the same compliance period” as 
developed countries. 
In hindsight, these efforts appear to have backfired because they elevated climate 
change considerably in the public debate and because they compelled President Clinton 
to deal with the issue as a top priority. This, in turn, gave the issue a much higher level 
of visibility internationally and triggered a considerable amount of pressure from the 
US, Japan, and some European countries on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
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Countries (OPEC) countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Before COP-3, few 
would have imagined that the Kyoto Protocol could have been adopted so smoothly. 
Even more surprising was the fact that these countries did not use the power conferred 
upon them by the consensus requirement for the adoption of protocols. Furthermore, 
Vice-President Al Gore flew to Kyoto at the beginning of the last week of negotiations 
and instructed the US negotiators to “show increased flexibility.” Chief negotiator, 
Stuart Eizenstat, had already reflected this new approach in his first intervention and, in 
the end, the US accepted a higher reduction target than the original stabilization target 
proposed by President Clinton. 
The negotiation process itself had already been given a major boost in March, when 
the European Community’s (EC) Environment Council had adopted a common target 
proposal and agreed on an internal burden-sharing arrangement. The EC proposed a 15 
per cent reduction target in 2010, from 1990 levels, for the emissions of a basket of three 
gases (carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide). Later in July, the EC environment 
ministers were able to agree on a 7.5 per cent reduction target from 1990 levels for the 
year 2005. With these figures, adopted by one of the major players, placed firmly on the 
table, a serious process of negotiation became possible. It took several months, however, 
for the US, Japan, Canada, and New Zealand to propose their own reduction targets. 
The Japanese proposal, which amounted to a 2.5 per cent reduction, on average, of three 
gases, proved to be particularly innovative because it contained a formula for the 
differentiation of obligations. However, only the stabilization of emissions was meant to 
be legally binding in the Japanese proposal. 
The formal elaboration of the negotiating text was promoted by the chair of the 
AGBM—the Argentinean ambassador to China, Raul Estrada-Oyuela, who proved to be 
one of the most important individuals in the process. With the help of the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, he compiled several versions of the negotiating text, which was to be 
gradually refined over time. The first compilation of proposals, more than one-hundred 
pages long, was presented to the AGBM 6 in March. Governments instructed 
Ambassador Estrada to compile a negotiating text before 1 June in order to meet the six-
month deadline required by Article 17.2 of the UNFCCC. After the seventh meeting of 
the AGBM (AGBM-7), which was held in August, a revised negotiating text was 
presented to the parties of the AGBM-8 in October. However, the real negotiations were 
conducted by Estrada behind the scenes. Several delegations, among them the EC, the 
US, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), expressly urged the chair at the 
close of AGBM-8 to continue seeking a solution and to “prepare alternative text.” No 
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one should have been surprised, therefore, that the text, which was finally agreed upon 
in Kyoto contained surprises for almost everyone. 
(3) The Kyoto Protocol 
The most important issue of the Kyoto Protocol was certainly the reduction targets for 
industrialized countries and their design, timeframe, and scope. Equally important, 
however, were the so-called “flexibility” instruments in the protocol, which provided 
much desired flexibility and innovation, but which also had the potential to weaken the 
targets considerably. The commitments of developing countries were not covered by the 
Berlin Mandate, and those parties succeeded in keeping even voluntary commitments 
out of the Kyoto Protocol. The parties to the UNFCCC furthermore agreed on policies 
and measures that would be implemented individually by Annex I parties. 
 
(A)  Legally Binding Reduction Targets 
For those industrialized countries listed in Annex B, the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC contains legally-binding, differentiated reduction targets for a basket of six 
gases (including two groups of gases) that are supposed to amount to an overall 
reduction of at least 5 per cent in the commitment period from 2008 until 2012 (Article 
3.1). It is important to note that these targets are legally binding as opposed to taking the 
soft law approach taken by the UNFCCC and advocated by some countries prior to 
COP-3. There was a clear understanding by almost all parties—industrialized and 
developing alike—that a voluntary approach had proven to be inadequate and that 
hard, verifiable, and enforceable obligations were absolutely necessary for the next 
stage. 
The commitment period of five years was originally proposed by the US under the 
term “budget period.” It is designed to avert the difficulties that a single-year target may 
pose due to fluctuations in economic performance or certain extreme weather 
conditions, and to provide parties with additional flexibility. Each party’s allowable 
emissions, set out in Annex B to the protocol, are multiplied by five for the five-year 
commitment period. Overshooting the target in a single year therefore becomes 
irrelevant. After the EC had accepted the concept of a budget period, its attempt to push 
for an earlier commitment period, from 2003 until 2007, failed. The only concession that 
the EC received from other industrialized countries was a soft provision in Article 3.2 
that “each Party ... shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable progress in achieving its 
commitments under this Protocol.” There are, however, no indicators yet to measure the 
achievement of this target. 
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The reduction target does not follow the single gas approach that was favoured by 
some parties, such as Germany, but instead places four gases and two groups of gases, 
which are contained in Annex A to the protocol, in a so-called “basket.” The reduction 
targets must be achieved for the basket as a whole. Since the respective radiating forces 
for each of these gases is different, the global warming potential for each gas, as 
determined by the IPCC, is used to calculate the overall obligation. The US succeeded in 
its attempt to have all major GHGs included in the basket, as opposed to the European 
and Japanese “three gases” approach. In addition to the main gases, including carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), the basket comprises sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6) and two groups of industrial gases, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs). Although 1990 remains the baseline for the three main gases, 
as a concession to Japan, the protocol provides that any party may use a 1995 baseline 
for calculating the emissions of the other gases. 
Negotiations regarding the “flat rate” target, with a uniform obligation for all 
industrialized countries, proved to be very difficult. It was not until the first week of 
negotiations in Kyoto, however, that the chair proposed a list of differentiated targets 
for certain groups of countries. Only the targets set for the US, the EC, and Japan follow 
a certain logic. By contrast, the targets for most other parties are based primarily on 
pledges or a “willingness to pay.” Those targets that allow an increase in emissions, 
which include an 8 per cent increase for Australia, a 10 per cent increase for Iceland, and 
a 1 per cent increase for Norway, are mainly the result of intransigence, chutzpah, and 
tough negotiating on the part of those countries. Other instances of tough negotiating 
are reflected in the obligations to merely stabilize emissions of New Zealand, Russia, 
and the Ukraine. The main industrial polluters, however, have assumed reduction 
obligations. The EC and its member states as well as most Eastern European countries 
must reduce GHG emissions by 8 per cent, the US must reduce by 7 per cent, and 
Canada and Japan must reduce by 6 per cent. Exceptions were granted to three Eastern 
European countries: Hungary and Poland have to reduce by only 6 per cent and Croatia 
must reduce by 5 per cent. 
The reduction targets agreed upon in the Kyoto Protocol should, however, not be 
taken at face value. Their value is diminished by the fact that sinks have been included 
in the inventories. The term “sink” is commonly used to refer to the uptake of GHGs by 
forests, soil, and other natural elements. This issue was among the most hotly debated in 
the lead up to COP-3. While the issue of sinks had already been addressed by the 
UNFCCC and always loomed in the background during the two-and-a-half years of 
AGBM negotiations, it was not until the AGBM-8 in October that the issue was finally 
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discussed in earnest. Due to the high level of uncertainty regarding the uptake of GHGs, 
many delegations felt that their inclusion into the inventories was premature. The final 
compromise allowed for the inclusion of net changes in GHG emissions resulting from 
direct human-induced land-use change (limited, at first, to afforestation, reforestation, 
and deforestation since 1990, according to Article 3.3). The organs of the UNFCCC are 
requested to consider adding other activities to this list, drawing upon further work by 
the IPCC. 
The inclusion of sinks might one day be considered to be the biggest flaw of the 
Kyoto Protocol. This is largely due to the uncertainty regarding afforestation, 
reforestation, and deforestation and their effects. Moreover, the language that is used in 
the protocol is not particularly clear and allows for a wide range of interpretations. 
Second, the Kyoto Protocol allows for the retroactive application of any decision on 
additional human-induced activities for the first commitment period. This creates even 
more uncertainty in regard to the actual scope of a party’s obligations. Third, the 
inclusion of sinks considerably reduces the obligations of a number of parties. The US 
administration has announced, for example, that its own obligation of 7 per cent 
reduction of GHGs with sinks equals a 4 per cent reduction without them. Thus, taking 
into account the 1 per cent reduction of its target due to the use of a 1995 baseline for the 
three GHGs, the US calculates its obligation as a mere 3 per cent reduction, which is 
much closer to the stabilization target originally proposed by President Clinton. Finally, 
perhaps most damaging is the fact that the inclusion of sinks might undermine the 
verifiability, and thus the credibility, of the Kyoto Protocol. It is of utmost importance, 
therefore, that future COPs clarify this issue in order to prevent an erosion of the 
protocol’s legitimacy and effectiveness. 
The EC succeeded in introducing its “bubble concept” into the final text of the 
protocol (Article 4). According to this concept, any group of Annex I parties may, upon 
ratification, notify the Secretariat that they intend to jointly fulfil their obligations under 
Article 3. The notification must set out the respective obligations for each party to such 
an agreement and will remain operative for the duration of a full commitment period. 
Under this arrangement, the accession of new members to the EC would not affect EC 
“bubble” arrangement for this period. Under an EC bubble, as long as the EC achieves 
its overall reduction target of 8 per cent, the community, as well as all of its member 
states, would be deemed to be in compliance. Should the EC fail to achieve its own 
target, the community (since it is also a party to the protocol), as well as those individual 
member states that have not achieved their target under the notified agreement, will be 
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held responsible (Article 4.6). Should the parties establish a non-compliance procedure, 
the EC might thus be faced with sanctions under this mechanism. 
The burden sharing arrangement, which had been agreed to by the Environment 
Council in March, will have to be renegotiated due to the inclusion of three more gases 
and the inclusion of sinks in the Kyoto Protocol. Nonetheless, the EC and its member 
states did not fare well in these negotiations. They failed, above all, to communicate the 
importance of the “bubble” to their partners and were not able to agree on legal 
language until late in the autumn. Furthermore, their first proposal contained some 
provisions that would have allowed the EC and its member states utmost flexibility. 
This was not only unacceptable to many other industrialized and developing countries, 
but it also undermined the EC’s credibility to press for higher reduction targets for all 
industrialized countries. It should be noted that Article 4 is framed in general terms and 
also allows other Annex I parties to enter into bubble agreements (which could be 
termed “trading without rules”). Already at COP-3, the US, Japan, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Russia were engaged in bubble negotiations. This general bubble 
provision has the potential to create a loophole in the protocol’s obligations. No 
mandate to negotiate further rules for “bubbling,” however, has been given to the COPs 
so far. 
 
(B)  Flexibility Instruments: Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean 
Development Mechanism 
In the negotiations of flexibility instruments, the United States placed top priority on 
reaching an agreement on certain economic instruments that would provide “flexibility” 
in the implementation of the reduction obligations. First among them was the possibility 
to “trade” surplus emission reductions with other parties. This demand, which was 
announced by the US at COP-2 in July 1996, was met cautiously by most of the 
European countries and with outright opposition by developing countries. The 
objections of developing countries were partly based on ethical grounds (“pollution 
rights”) and were used partly as a negotiating ploy against another US demand—the 
inclusion of developing country commitments. Furthermore, developing countries 
feared, as did the EC, that trading might provide a cheap way for the US, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand to “buy” themselves out of their obligations. 
The compromise that was finally reached incorporates these different considerations. 
At some point during the last night of negotiations, the article on emissions trading 
disappeared from the draft, only to resurface in rudimentary form in the unlikely 
location of Article 16bis, situated between the clauses on a “multilateral consultative 
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process” and on “non-compliance.” Only the basic principle has been incorporated into 
the Kyoto Protocol (now Articles 17, 3.10 and 3.11). Parties included in Annex B may 
participate in emissions trading for the purpose of complying with their obligations. 
This shall be supplemental to domestic action, with the relevant principles, modalities, 
rules, and guidelines to be defined by the COP.  
Some confusion exists with respect to the starting date of emissions trading. Whereas 
the US and Canada believe that trading should start immediately, the EC and others 
claim that the relevant rules of the mechanism will have to be established first. The latter 
interpretation appears to be correct for two reasons. First, the order of the first two 
sentences of Article 17 was changed at a very late stage so that the establishment of 
relevant rules would appear first in the text. This was done in order to accommodate the 
concerns of the EC and the G-77. This semantic interpretation, therefore, points to a 
compromise that should not be disregarded. Second, on a political level, the 
establishment of an effective trading system requires certainty and credibility. These 
two elements simply cannot be achieved without basic rules agreed upon beforehand, 
especially in regard to the issues of verifiability, reporting, and accountability. A system 
without adequate rules does not make sense, either economically or politically. 
As intriguing as the theoretical concept of emissions trading might be, the huge 
emission reductions in Russia and the Ukraine since 1990 as a result of economic 
disruptions could transform Article 17 into a “loophole” that might considerably 
weaken the protocol targets. Russia’s current emissions of carbon dioxide are 
approximately 30 per cent below the 1990 level. Those of the Ukraine are even lower, 
and, in both cases, emission levels are expected to remain substantially below the 1990 
levels during the 2008-2012 commitment period. This so-called “hot air” constitutes a 
“reservoir” from which Western countries might cheaply buy emission credits. The 
mere possibility of such a solution might prevent some countries from undertaking any 
serious domestic action. The German environment minister has therefore called for a 50 
per cent cap on the percentage of a country’s obligation that can be achieved through 
trading. As outlined earlier, these rules will have to be negotiated during the next two or 
three years. 
Joint implementation (JI) is the second of the flexibility instrument that has been 
incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol. An agreement on the establishment of a JI 
mechanism at COP-1 had not been possible because many industrialized countries 
insisted on the participation of developing countries in this mechanism. Instead, a pilot 
phase of “activities implemented jointly”, without any crediting of achieved emission 
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reductions, was established until the end of the decade. At COP-3, after industrialized 
countries had taken on substantial obligations and dropped the demand for developing 
country participation, joint implementation with crediting among Annex I countries was 
possible, and passed negotiations (Article 6).  
The basic concept of JI, which should be supplemental to domestic actions (Article 
6.1(d)), has been known for some time and need not be elaborated here. However, two 
aspects are worth mentioning. First, Article 6.1 refers to Annex I of the UNFCCC and 
not to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. This provision not only reduces the incentives for 
Annex I countries to ratify the protocol but also allows countries to take part in JI 
without taking on legally binding obligations by becoming a party to the protocol. The 
absence of an emissions cap therefore requires the rules and guidelines for JI to be as 
strict as if developing countries were participating. Second, any party may authorize 
certain legal entities to participate, under its responsibility, in JI activities (Article 6.3). 
This paves the way for extensive private sector participation and thus further highlights 
the need for clear and verifiable guidelines. The Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol is mandated to elaborate the guidelines for the implementation of JI (Article 
6.2). In the meantime, COP-3 instructed the subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC to 
examine these matters with a view to their consideration by COP-4. 
A modified version of JI was included in the Kyoto Protocol with respect to project-
based activities in developing countries. The parties established a Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) in order to assist Annex I parties in achieving compliance with part 
of their obligations (Article 12.2). The negotiation history of this mechanism, which was 
originally proposed by Brazil as a “clean development fund” under a compliance 
regime, is rather complex. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that the CDM is a type of 
institutionalized JI, especially since it derives most of its language from the provisions of 
Article 6. Under the supervision of an executive board, private and public funds are to 
be channelled through this mechanism to finance projects in developing countries. As in 
the case of JI, but with slightly different wording, any party “may involve private 
and/or public entities” in the regime. 
As with JI, the specific modalities and procedures of the CDM will have to be 
elaborated by the parties. Due to the EC’s lack of attention in the final hours of 
negotiations, emission reductions that are achieved from 2000 until 2008 may be banked 
and credited towards industrialized countries’ obligations in the first commitment 
period. The hasty drafting of many provisions of the Kyoto Protocol is also visible in 
Article 12. While emission reductions may be banked after 2000, it is up to the Meeting 
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of the Parties to the protocol to elaborate the specific rules. Since the Kyoto Protocol is 
unlikely to enter into force before the year 2000, however, this task will have to be 
carried out by the COP to the UNFCCC. One innovative aspect of the CDM is that a 
“share of the proceeds” from project activities is to be used to cover its administrative 
expenses. Another part of those proceeds is to be used to assist particularly vulnerable 
developing countries to meet the costs of adapting to a changing climate. 
 
(C)  Developing Countries 
China and the G-77, as the group of approximately 130 developing countries is 
commonly known in the sphere of multilateral diplomacy, got involved in the main 
negotiations at a rather late stage. This was mainly due to the fact that negotiations 
between the major industrialized nations had not been resolved until this point. The 
Berlin Mandate, which was adopted at COP-1, specifically provided that the “protocol 
or another legal instrument” adopted by COP-3 should not contain any new 
commitments for developing countries. Nevertheless, at the end of the first week, New 
Zealand, perhaps on behalf of the United States, proposed a rather detailed timetable for 
the negotiations of such commitments, which effectively ended negotiations for that 
day. Thirty developing countries took the floor and vehemently protested against this 
proposal. 
In the early morning of 11 December, developing countries blocked the adoption of 
an article that would have provided for their voluntary participation by accepting an 
obligation to limit future emissions and thus be included in Annex B of the protocol. 
Although this draft provision drew some support from Latin American countries and 
members of the AOSIS, countries such as India and China did not want to create a new 
category of parties. As the Kyoto Protocol stands now, developing country 
commitments are restricted to voluntary participation in the CDM and to the 
undertaking of general commitments according to Article 10. Using the same approach 
as Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC, Article 10 contains, for all parties, general obligations to 
formulate national programs and develop political, as well as scientific, cooperation. 
 
(D)  Other Matters 
Other provisions of the Kyoto Protocol deal with “policies and measures” review of 
the protocol, non-compliance, institutional questions, and ratification. The EC devoted a 
considerable amount of time and energy during the negotiations to an elaboration of 
several lists of policies and measures with different levels of bindingness. However, the 
EC did not succeed in including a list of prescriptive policies and measures that would 
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have to be implemented either as common measures or that would be compulsory for 
all parties. Instead, at the insistence of the US and other non-European industrialized 
countries, Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol merely stipulates some rather general 
obligations to improve energy efficiency, promote sustainable forms of agriculture, 
reduce “market imperfections,” such as fiscal incentives and subsidies, and take 
measures to limit and/or reduce emissions from the transport sector (Article 2.1(a)). In 
regard to aviation and marine bunker fuels, parties are called upon to seek a limitation 
and reduction of emissions through the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (Article 2.2). 
Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for an in-depth review of the information 
submitted in accordance with Article 7 and is modelled after the review procedure 
elaborated by parties in the UNFCCC. Article 7 requires the Annex I-Parties that are 
Party to the Protocol to include in their annual inventory of GHG emissions and sinks 
"the necessary supplementary information for the purposes of ensuring compliance with 
Article 3" of the Protocol. This is first and foremost information on GHGs other than 
carbon dioxide. Second, "each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its national 
communication submitted under Article 12 FCCC the supplementary information 
necessary to demonstrate compliance with its commitments under this Protocol". The 
information shall be reviewed by "expert review teams" coordinated by the Secretariat 
according to a procedure (including country visits) that follows in large part the "in-
depth review procedure" developed under the Convention. 
A non-compliance procedure shall be approved by the Meeting of the Parties to the 
protocol, including an indicative list of consequences (Article 18). Its effectiveness might 
be somewhat impaired, however, because the US insisted that any binding consequence 
under the mechanism will have to be adopted by means of an amendment to the 
protocol. One lesson to be learned from the procedure elaborated in the framework of 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, however, might be 
the necessity for “consequences” being adopted by way of a decision that provides for a 
uniform application to all parties instead of making its application dependent on the 
prior consent of a Party. A possible solution might be the adoption of an amendment 
and the subsequent provisional application by way of a decision of the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties. 
The multilateral consultative process—a “help-desk function” that is currently 
negotiated under Article 13 of the UNFCCC—might be applied to the protocol (Article 
16). It was not possible to incorporate an express provision for the “review of the 
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adequacy of commitments.” This was particularly disappointing for many delegations 
that were seeking progress in the years to come, in view of the fact that such a provision 
was of vital importance for both the development of the UNFCCC and for the 
negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. Article 9, however, does provide for a “periodical 
review” of the protocol, with the first one to take place at the second Meeting of the 
Parties to the protocol. This wording does allow for a regular review of commitments, 
although it lacks a specific timetable. 
The institutional arrangements of the Kyoto Protocol were the subject of intense 
negotiations. The majority of parties did not want to establish any new institutions, 
partly for reasons of “institutional economy” and partly in order to keep as much power 
in the hands of the UNFCCC’s bodies as possible. Accordingly, the Kyoto Protocol does 
not expressly establish any new institutions and any further negotiations until the entry 
into force of the Protocol, any further negotiations on its outstanding issues will be 
conducted within the Convention’s bodies. As a result, the protocol’s Secretariat (Article 
14) and its subsidiary bodies (Article 15) shall be those of the UNFCCC. Article 13.1 
further states that the COP to the UNFCCC will also serve as the Meeting of the Parties 
to the protocol. In fact, throughout the protocol, the supreme body is referred to as “the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties.”  
The institutions under the Kyoto Protocol are characterized by a rather hybrid nature. 
As stipulated in Article 17.5 of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol reiterates the principle 
that decisions made under the protocol shall be taken only by those that are parties to it 
(Article 13.2). Non-parties to the protocol may participate in the proceedings as 
observers. Furthermore, those members of the Bureau of the COP that are not party to 
the protocol shall be substituted by an additional member (Article 13.3). The same rules 
for voting and membership that apply to the bureau apply to the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation under 
the protocol (Article 15.2 and 15.3). Despite the language used in Articles 13.1 and 15.1, 
the institutions established under the Kyoto Protocol can thus be considered to be 
separate bodies from those serving under the convention. The ambiguous language will 
create problems for the Secretariat, however, since the budgeting and the allocation of 
costs will be made much more difficult. 
Finally, the entry-into-force provision of the Kyoto Protocol merits some attention. It 
has been designed in such a way as to require participation by all major polluters. This 
should be welcomed in principle because the protocol needs a certain “critical mass” to 
be effective, and there are valid concerns in regard to the potential “leakage” of GHG 
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emissions to non-parties. However, the threshold for ratification appears to be 
unnecessarily high. Article 25 of the protocol employs a “double-trigger.” It not only 
requires ratification by fifty-five parties to the UNFCCC, but the Annex I parties who 
ratify the protocol must account for/represent at least 55 per cent of the total carbon 
dioxide emissions of Annex I parties in 1990. In order to avoid uncertainty as to the 
exact numbers, the authoritative data is that which is communicated by the parties in 
their first national communication, according to Article 12 of the UNFCCC. 
This threshold confers upon the US a de facto veto power since it comprised no less 
than 35 per cent of Annex I emissions in 1990. If the US does not ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, virtually all other industrialized countries will have to accede to the protocol 
in order for it to enter into force. Given the very slow and uncertain ratification 
procedure in the US Congress, the protocol’s entry into force will inevitably be delayed 
until some time after the year 2000. Besides the US, the EC was partly responsible for 
this high threshold, since it was unwilling to assume any obligations without the US’s 
ratification. 
 
(4) The Way Ahead 
The Kyoto Protocol, despite its apparent flaws, should be regarded as a milestone in 
the history of climate protection. It provides a relatively sound basis on which to 
proceed into the next century, although the inclusion of sinks will be problematic. If the 
protocol is ratified by the US, it stands a good chance of evolving into a truly effective 
instrument. Much will depend on the decisions that are made at the next several COPs, 
which will undoubtedly face considerable workloads. Already COP-4, which will be 
held in November 1998 in Buenos Aires, will have to deal with the specific rules 
regarding emissions trading, joint implementation, and the possible inclusion of further 
categories of sinks into the inventories. Additional tasks include the development of 
rules for the CDM, the future participation of developing countries, and the elaboration 
of a non-compliance procedure. These last issues, while not referred to the convention’s 
bodies by the protocol, will nevertheless have to be resolved before its entry into force. 
It is therefore very likely that the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force only in some 
amended form, either formally amended or amended by way of extensive 
decisionmaking. Formal amendments might, for example, be necessary to allow for the 
participation of developing countries or for the adoption of a non-compliance procedure 
involving binding consequences. The trading system, on the other hand, might only 
need to be elaborated through decisions of the COPs. Furthermore, the parties to the 
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protocol will have to resolve one of the biggest problems, which also faces the UNFCCC, 
namely, the voting procedure. Like the convention, the Kyoto Protocol lacks any 
provision on voting, except in relation to the adoption of amendments and annexes, 
which require a three-fourths majority (Articles 20.3 and 21.4). For the protocol to be 
truly effective, however, some kind of majority voting is essential.  
The Kyoto Protocol, therefore, does not represent a final solution to the manifold 
problems confronting the international community in regard to cooperation on climate 
change. It does, however, provide a sound basis for international climate policy in the 
next century. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it does send a clear signal to 
policymakers, industry, and other relevant domestic actors that climate change has been 
firmly placed on the world’s agenda. Because of its far-reaching implications for the way 
we produce and consume, the Kyoto Protocol is likely to affect the life of every person 
living on this planet in the next century more than any other international agreement. 
 
